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as soon as a rich country welcomes an additional migrant, global inequalities are reduced,
and each citizen in the rich world is better off too. Our model is calibrated using statistics on
immigration, working-age population and output. We simulate the proposed scheme on
different sets of rich countries.
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Abstract
Although movements of capital, goods and services are growing in importance,
workers movements are impeded by restrictive policies in rich countries. Such regu-
lations carry substantial economic costs for developing countries, and prevent global
inequality from declining. Even if rich countries are averse to global inequality, a sin-
gle country lacks incentives to welcome additional migrants as it would bear the costs
alone while the beneﬁts accrue to all rich states. Aversion to global inequality confers
a public good nature to the South-North migration of low-skill workers. We propose
an alternative allocation of labor maximizing global welfare subject to the constraints
that the rich countries are at least as well oﬀ as in the current “nationalist” (or “Nash-
ionalist”) situation. This “no regret” allocation can be decentralized by a tax-subsidy
scheme which makes people internalize the fact that as soon as a rich country wel-
comes an additional migrant, global inequalities are reduced, and each citizen in the
rich world is better oﬀ too. Our model is calibrated using statistics on immigration,
working-age population and output. We simulate the proposed scheme on diﬀerent
sets of rich countries.
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An undeniably stylized fact of the last 50 years is that, with a few exceptions, the poorest
countries of the world have not caught up with the industrialized nations in any meaningful
way. Although a considerable amount of research has been devoted to understanding the
growth and development processes, economists have not yet discovered how to help poor
countries take oﬀ. For example, the issue of the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid has given rise to
many controversial contributions.1
Another clue to reducing global poverty is to allow more low-skill workers to migrate from
poor to rich countries. As argued in many recent studies, low-skill migration generates huge
gains for migrants, their families and, most importantly, the sending countries. By relaxing
labor market constraints at origin and inducing large amounts of remittances, low-skill mi-
gration should be seen as an explicit component of the development policy of the rich world.
In the Global Economic Prospects, the World Bank (2008) reported that international re-
mittances received by developing countries (around 170 billion US dollars in 2005, two thirds
of which was sent from developed countries) had doubled since 2000 and were twice as large
as oﬃcial development aid. Records still underestimate the full scale of remittances: un-
recorded ﬂows through informal channels may conservatively add 50 percent to oﬃcial ﬂows.
Although the growth impact is unclear, remittances do obviously play an important role
in reducing poverty. Migration has other economic implications for poor countries beyond
remittances. It raises the demand for low-skill workers at the margin, leading to higher
wages, lower unemployment and greater labor force participation. It creates ties between
countries, reducing transaction and informational costs. Hence, it is not surprising that de-
velopment agencies promote migration of the low skilled. For example, the Commitment to
Development Index (CDI) computed by the Center for Global Development, an independent
American think tank that works to reduce global poverty and inequality, rewards immigra-
tion of low-skill people in its index of generosity of advanced countries towards developing
countries.
Although movements of capital, goods and services are growing in importance in an increas-
ingly globalized world, workers movements are impeded by highly restrictive and heavily
regulated markets for global labor. This is especially true for the low-skill population. In a
recent study, Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) estimated that low-skill emigrants only
represented 1.3 of the low-skill population born in developing countries in 1990 and 2000.
This proportion looks small given huge wage diﬀerentials observed between high-income and
low-income countries.
Although the migration pressure is likely to intensify in the coming decades (given the rising
gap in wages between South and North countries and their diﬀerent demographic futures),
migration ﬂows are constrained by immovable anti-immigration sentiments among the citi-
1Burnside and Dollar (2000) found that the impact of aid on growth was positive in good policy environ-
ments (after accounting for the endogeneity of policy and aid). This result has been questioned by Hansen
and Tarp (2000) who introduced non-linearities into the aid-growth relationship, and by Easterly, Levine,
and Roodman (2003) who used more recent data. In addition, it has been argued that foreign assistance
may generate aid dependency relationships in poor countries (see Kanbur 2006).
2zens of rich countries. Regulations which restrict migration carry considerable economic costs
for developing countries, and prevent global inequality from declining. Clearly, “breaking the
gridlock on international labor migration” requires solutions that are politically acceptable
in rich countries. In his recent book, Pritchett (2006) advocates several solutions including
the greater use of temporary work permits, permit rationing, reliance on bilateral rather than
multilateral agreements, and protection of migrants’ fundamental human rights. However
none of these suggestions seem strong enough to counterbalance the lack of incentives for
North citizens to host more low-skill migrants.
This paper uses a political economy model of immigration barriers. The political economy
framework is appropriate for explaining immigration restrictions in advanced countries. This
was shown by Facchini and Mayda (2008) who analyzed and quantiﬁed the role played by
economic channels (labor market, welfare state, eﬃciency gains) on voters’ preferences to-
wards immigration. We build on the same idea that citizens’ preferences are key ingredients
of a political economy model of immigration. However, our purpose is to design an incentive-
compatible mechanism that could raise the number of South-North migrants. Our model
describes an economy with a set of heterogeneous rich countries and one poor emigration
country (representing the group of developing nations). It relies on a minimal set of assump-
tions. First, physical capital at destination is only owned by citizens who share the surplus
income generated by immigrants (which varies with country’s total factor productivity).
Second, host countries face heterogeneous costs of low-skill immigration; potential reasons
for such costs include xenophobic preferences, fear of unemployment, feelings of insecurity
and costs of redistribution (in response to price changes or welfare transfers). Third, citizens
from all rich countries are averse to global inequality, albeit to a small extent, and internalize
that welcoming low-skill migrants from the South reduces extreme poverty.
We model aversion to global inequality using maximin altruistic preferences: the utility of
citizens in the rich world depends on their own level of income and the income of the worst
oﬀ (i.e. low-skill workers living in developing countries). Many behavioral and experimental
studies have revealed that individual choices are inﬂuenced by social preferences, including
altruism, fairness, reciprocity and aversion for inequality (Fehr and Schmidt 2006). The
(quasi-) maximin model relates to the ideas presented by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), that
players want to help all other players, but are particularly keen to help the person who is
worst oﬀ. It has been tested by Charness and Rabin (2002, 2005). Laboratory experiments
reveal that this model does signiﬁcantly better than altruism or pure self-interest, indicating
that there is indeed much concern for those who are getting the lowest payoﬀs. Fehr and
Schmidt (2006) examined the conditions under which the maximin motive plays a role in
naturally occurring environments. In a competitive environment, or in an environment where
the players view each other as agents behaving strategically, the maximin motive is not likely
to be important. However, the maximin motive is highly relevant in the context of charitable
giving or in the context of elections with a large number of people, where strategic voting is
unlikely to occur. Development assistance, donation to charities and NGOs, or international
community’s eﬀorts to reach the Millenium Development Goals are evidence of the rich
world’s concern for extreme poverty. Nevertheless, it should be clear that our model of
social preferences is equivalent to a model of self-interest in which improving the situation of
the worst-oﬀ beneﬁts to the donor (see Andreoni 2006). For example, development objectives
3of the 1970s and 1980s obviously included shoring up support from poor countries in the
geopolitics of the cold war. After the fall of the Berlin wall, other targets appeared such as
the “war on terror”. In the same vein, hosting low-skill legal immigrants might help the rich
world reach some of these selﬁsh objectives, e.g. reducing the inﬂow of illegal migration and
refugees.
An important implication of altruism is that all host states receive beneﬁts when any state
welcomes poor immigrants. Altruism confers a public good nature to immigration. In
other words, poverty reduction is a public good whose ﬁnancing is subject to a coordination
problem. Although households in rich countries suﬀer from the idea that people in developing
countries are really poor, it is not optimal for them to vote for welcoming additional migrants
since they bear the cost alone while the beneﬁts accrue to everybody in the world who cares
about poverty. We exploit the possible gains underlying this coordination problem.
In a diﬀerent setting, Rose Skaksen, Malchow-Møller, and Aastrup Jensen (2007) studied the
implications of coordinating immigration policies among destination countries. The model
contains two types of spill-overs, a terms of trade externality (immigration causes wages
and prices to decrease at destination) and a welfare policy externality (ﬁscal competition to
attract immigrants). They show that coordination does not necessarily increase the volume
of immigration. It is only the case if the terms of trade externality dominates the welfare
policy externality. Based on humanitarian motives, hosting refugees raises the welfare of
all potential host-states. Hence, individuals might be expected to obtain some beneﬁt from
the knowledge that refugees also ﬁnd safety in a tier country. On this basis, Hatton (2004)
and Hatton and Williamson (2006) argued that EU asylum policy can be viewed as the
local provision of public goods, raising the issue of policy coordination across countries.
In Bubb, Kremer, and Levine (2007), the main coordination problem comes from the fact
that distinguishing refugees and economic migrants (who simply want to raise their wage) is
costly. Host countries can then use restrictions (high standard of proof) to deter immigration.
This choice exhibits strategic complementarity: “as more states increase their standard of
proof, the best response to other states may be to increase the standard of proof.”There is
a coordination problem there giving rise to multiple equilibria (high or low restrictions for
all). The authors see the “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”(basically,
a convention imposing the “non-refoulement”of refugees) as a Pareto-optimal improving
contract that bound states to lower their standard of proof and provide a more eﬃcient level
of global public good. Unlike their paper, our model exhibits strategic substitutability: as
more states decrease their level of low-skill immigration, the best response of other states is to
let more people come in. This excludes the possibility of multiple equilibria, although it does
not solve coordination failure. Moreover, none of these studies proceeded to a quantitative
assessment of the welfare gain from coordination.
We ﬁrst construct an allocation of labor in which each rich country decides its immigration
level so as to maximize the welfare of its citizens, taking the choices of other countries as
given. This Nash equilibrium is labeled as the nationalist (or Nashionalist) allocation. At
that allocation, the resulting demand for low-skill immigrants can reasonably be assumed
to be lower than the supply. Assuming the nationalist allocation is the observed one, the
model can be calibrated using statistics on immigration, working-age population and out-
4put. Based on the calibrated parameters, we consider an alternative allocation which leaves
host countries indiﬀerent compared to the nationalist scenario and maximizes the volume
of South-North low-skill migration (or equivalently, utility in the South). This allocation is
labeled the no-regret allocation. Because there are positive externalities across rich coun-
tries when they jointly lower barriers to immigration, it is possible to increase global labor
movements without any utility cost for the rich. We then show that the no-regret allocation
can be decentralized by a tax-subsidy scheme which makes people internalize the social gains
and costs of migration. For diﬀerent degrees of altruism, we can compute the global rise
in low-skill migration and country-speciﬁc tax and subsidy rates which allow the no-regret
allocation to be decentralized. We simulate the proposed scheme for diﬀerent sets of rich
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory. The application of the
theory using statistics on immigration, working-aged population and output is proposed in
Section 3. Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 Theory
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the framework used to model the attitudes towards low-
skill immigrants in rich receiving countries. Second, we study the political economy of
South-North migration when each host state maximizes its own welfare function taking
the immigration rates of other receiving states as given. This non-cooperative allocation
is labeled the nationalist allocation. Third, we model an alternative allocation (labeled
the no-regret allocation) in which the number of migrants is maximized subject to a set
of implementability constraints. Given the public good nature of migration, it is possible
to increase the number of immigrants without welfare losses at destinations. The last sub-
section investigates how such an allocation can be decentralized with country-speciﬁc lump-
sum taxes and subsidies per migrant.
2.1 The Environment
The world is made of J + 1 countries, J developed (j = 1..J) and 1 developing (indexed
by 0) representing the whole developing world. As the international allocation of labor is
determined by the votes of rich countries’ citizens, the J developed states are the main actors
in the game.
Inside each country, residents are either citizens or migrants. Both groups are homogenous.
Every person in the world has preferences deﬁned over its own consumption, cj for citizens
and cm
j for migrants in country j, and over consumption of the poorest c0, i.e. those left
in the developing world. In addition, citizens’ preferences depend on the ratio of migrants
to citizens in their country mj/nj, while migrants’ preferences include a cost of migration.2
2Migrants are likely to be the main beneﬁciaries of the migration process. But their utility plays no role
in our analysis.
5Preferences are represented by the following utility function:






The utility from consumption u(c) is increasing and concave. Individuals are possibly al-
truistic with respect to the poorest people, i.e. β ≥ 0.3 The functional form of the ﬁrst
part of the utility, u(cj) + βu(c0), reﬂects universal maximin preferences and is accordingly
the same across the world. On the other hand, the utility cost of hosting migrants varies
across countries, reﬂecting diﬀerences in institutions. In country j it is given by the function




0(x) = +∞ (2)
Potential reasons for such costs include xenophobic preferences, feelings of insecurity, demo-
graphic congestion, and the costs of redistribution. Each of these determinants is country-
speciﬁc and can also be time-varying. In 1997, a European Union-wide survey revealed that
33 percent of interviewees openly described themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist”4.
The degree of expressed racism varied strongly across countries, peaking at 55 percent in
Belgium and amounting to only 14 percent in Luxembourg and Austria. Feelings of in-
security undoubtedly change across years and states; the attacks of September 11, 2001,
transformed the landscape of global security and created suspicion toward Arab and Muslim
communities, especially in the United States. The fear of unemployment or of a fall in wages
depends on the substitutability between citizens and immigrants on the labor market, which
is itself aﬀected by the skill composition of the local labor force. Finally, although the net
contribution of migrants to welfare transfers does not need to be negative5, the generosity of
the welfare state aﬀects individual attitudes towards immigrants. Using survey data, Fac-
chini and Mayda (2009) showed that the attitudes of high- and low-skill citizens towards
immigration diﬀer and depend on the generosity of welfare beneﬁts, average tax rates and
tax progressivity. Notice that the cost is a function of the ratio mj/nj and not mj alone,
reﬂecting the idea that what matters is the proportion of migrants in the total population
rather than their absolute number.
In our model, one physical good is produced in each country using labor input lj, with
technology µjf(lj), with f increasing and concave (this reﬂects the existence of an unspeciﬁed
ﬁxed factor). The variable µj reﬂects both the size of the ﬁxed factors and their productivity.
lj stands for the quantity of labor used in the economy, including immigrant workers.
3See e.g. Azam and Laﬀont (2003) for a similar assumption.
4See the Eurobarometer Opinion Poll 47.1 on “Racism and Xenophobia in Europe” presented in Luxem-
bourg in December 1997.
5See Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) and Bonin, Raﬀelh¨ uschen, and Walliser (2000) who show that
immigration reduces the burden of aging in the United States and Germany. Chojnicki (2006) disaggregated
the French net-tax proﬁles of immigrants by schooling level. He shows that low-skill immigrants exhibited a
very modest, albeit positive contribution between the ages of 30 and 50. In the same vein, Boeri, Hanson,
and McCormick (2002) conﬁrmed that the contribution of immigrants to the ﬁscal balance of the welfare
state improves with their skills.
6Labor input in the poor country is made up of the citizens minus those who emigrate to
each of the developed countries. Representing the number of migrants from 0 to j by mj,
and the j × 1 vector of the mj’s by m, we have
l0 = n0 − m
0 1J (3)
where 1J is a column vector of ones of dimension J. In developed countries the labor input
is given by lj = nj +mj. We assume that in equilibrium there is migration from 0 to j only,
not from j to i ∈ J, i.e., we disregard migration ﬂows between developed countries.
Deﬁnition 1 (Country) A country j is a triplet Ωj = {nj,µj,γj} representing population,
technology and preferences towards migrants.
Both local and immigrant workers are paid at their marginal productivity. Locals moreover
receive the proﬁts of the country they live in, e.g, because ﬁrms or land belong to the citizens.





and for a citizen in country j, it includes wages and proﬁts:
cj = µjf
0(nj + mj) +
1
nj
[µjf(nj + mj) − (nj + mj)µjf
0(nj + mj)]. (4)











which is a decreasing function of the quantity of labor l0 left in developing countries.
2.2 Nationalist Allocation
The population of each potential host country is divided into citizens and migrants. Only
citizens have a right to vote and decide what is in their best interest. Remember that it is
precisely in the context of elections with a large number of people, where strategic voting is
unlikely to occur, that maximin preferences are highly relevant (i.e. voters care about the
worst-oﬀ).
When voters of a given rich country decide the migration level, they take the actions of other
rich countries as given. Hence, the nationalist allocation is a “Nashionalist” equilibrium.
Migrants are paid at their marginal productivity and the proﬁt they generate beneﬁts the
citizens. Hence, an increase in immigration will lower the wages of the citizens but will
increase their proﬁts. In a classical framework such as ours with two production factors
and decreasing marginal returns, the second eﬀect dominates. The positive net increase in
7income of the indigenous population of the host country is the immigration surplus. When
citizens vote on immigration, this surplus must be supplemented by the altruistic gain from
reducing poverty, and compared with the cost of hosting migrants.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the utility of the representative citizen as a function of the migration
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Immigration has three eﬀects on the utility of citizens. At the nationalist allocation these
three forces balance out at the margin:
• The ﬁrst term in (7) represents the net increase in citizens’ income generated by the
marginal migrant. Although increasing the labor force decreases the output per person,
it generates a higher income for the citizens since proﬁts accrue to citizens only. This
is the immigration surplus. Borjas (1995) provided rough estimates of the immigration
surplus for the US. With one type of labor, he arrived at the pessimistic conclusion that
a 10 percent increase in the workforce through migration aﬀects citizens’ incomes by
about 0.1 percent. In a framework with two types of workers, the educational structure
of immigration matters. The surplus is a U-shaped function of the proportion of high-
skill among migrants. In the U.S. case, it amounts to 0.1 percent of income if the
proportion of high-skill immigrants equals the proportion of high-skill citizens. It can
reach 0.5 percent of citizens’ average income if all the immigrants are highly skilled
(most of the beneﬁts accrue to low-skill citizens), and 0.36 percent if all immigrants are
low skilled (most of the beneﬁts accrue to high-skill citizens). Drinkwater et al. (2007)
obtained more optimistic values for the surplus associated with high-skill immigration
and conversely more pessimistic values for low-skill when the growth rate is a function
of the proportion of high-skill workers in the economy.
• The second term in (7) captures the eﬀect of migration on the average income at origin.
Welcoming an additional migrant raises the marginal productivity in the South and
improves the well-being of those left behind. If l0 is large this eﬀect is likely to be
small. For each developed country taken individually this second term plays a minor
role in the determination of the migration rate.
• The third term in (7) represents the marginal utility cost of increasing migration.
Let us now deﬁne a nationalist allocation:
8Deﬁnition 2 A nationalist allocation is a vector ˜ m such that citizens’ utility ϕj([˜ m1..˜ mj−1,
mj, ˜ mj+1.., ˜ mJ]0) is maximized with respect to mj in each developed country j = 1..J given
the migration choices of other countries.
Because of condition (2), the migration rate maximizing citizens’ utility cannot be inﬁ-
nite. Such a maximizer ˜ mj can either be a corner (˜ mj = 0) or an interior solution. If
it is an interior solution, it should satisfy: ∂ϕj(m)/∂mj = 0, ∂2ϕj(m)/∂m2
j < 0 and
ϕj([m1..mj−1, ˜ mj,mj+1..,mJ]0) ≥ ϕj([m1..mj−1,0,mj+1..,mJ]0) for all j.
The following proposition determines the eﬀects of the two important parameters, cost of
migration γj and productivity µj on the desired migration level ˜ mj when it is interior.
Proposition 1 When the nationalist allocation is an interior maximum for country j, the
immigration level ˜ mj is decreasing in γj. Moreover, it is increasing in µj if and only if the
elasticity of marginal utility to consumption is lower than one in absolute value.
Proof: The interior maximum satisﬁes ∂ϕj(m)/∂mj = 0 and ∂2ϕj(m)/∂m2
j < 0. The ﬁrst
order condition ∂ϕj(m)/∂mj = 0 deﬁnes an implicit function Ψ(mj,µj,γj,nj). Applying






















Hence, d˜ mj/dγj = −Ψ0
γ/Ψ0
m < 0, and d˜ mj/dµj = −Ψ0
µ/Ψ0
m > 0 ⇔ σj < 1.￿
The interpretation is the following. First, countries with high γj will unsurprisingly be more
reluctant to welcome immigrants. Second, it is not necessarily in the interest of countries
with high productivity to welcome relatively more migrants. To understand the proposition
let us consider the ﬁrst term of Equation (7). This term describes the gain in the migration
surplus in terms of utility. The eﬀect of µj on this term is ambiguous. On the one hand,
the larger µj, the larger is the eﬀect of mj on the surplus. On the other hand, the higher
µj, the bigger is the level of income and the lower is the marginal utility of income. When
σ is bigger than one, the second eﬀect dominates. In that case, richer countries prefer a low
mj/nj ratio and host fewer migrants. Obviously, with the logarithmic utility function, which
will be used in the numerical experiment, σj = 1.
92.3 No-Regret Allocation
Under maximin preferences, the nationalist allocation of labor is subject to a coordination
failure that leaves all countries worse oﬀ than in a coordinated equilibrium. Hence, an
international agency maximizing a social welfare function aggregating the utility levels of rich
countries’ citizens could reach a better allocation. We avoid deﬁning such an arbitrary social
welfare function and take advantage of the eﬃciency gains from coordination to improve the
situation of developing countries. In other words, we consider an alternative allocation which
leaves host countries indiﬀerent, compared to the nationalist scenario, and maximizes the
volume of South-North low-skill migration. If it existed, such an allocation would improve
the level of income in developing countries (given equation (5)), improve the utility of new
migrants, and leave citizens at destination indiﬀerent. Our no-regret allocation can be deﬁned
as following:
Deﬁnition 3 A no-regret allocation is a vector ¯ m such that m0 1J is maximized6 subject to
ϕj(˜ m) ≤ ϕj(¯ m) for j = 1..J (8)
Since utility in the South decreases with l0, maximizing m0 1J is identical to maximizing the
average utility of residents of developing countries. Inequality (8) is the implementability
constraint.
Assuming that the solution ¯ m > 0, and denoting by λj the Lagrange multiplier associated












λj(ϕj(¯ m) − ϕj(˜ m)) = 0,
λj ≥ 0,
ϕj(¯ m) ≥ ϕj(˜ m).














The summation term in Equation (9) reﬂects the fact that the externality in now internalized.
The derivative ∂ϕk(m)/∂mj is the positive eﬀect on the utility in country k when country j
welcomes one additional migrant.
6Note that ¯ m0 1J < n0 because of marginal decreasing return to labor.
10Considering only situations in which the implementability constraints are binding, i.e. λj >
0 for all j, and rearranging Equation (9), leads to the characterization of the no-regret

































¯ cj = µjf
0(nj + ¯ mj) +
1
nj
[µjf(nj + ¯ mj) − (nj + ¯ mj)µjf
0(nj + ¯ mj)] (11)
0 = ϕj(˜ m) − ϕj(¯ m) (12)
¯ l0 = n0 − ¯ m
0 1J (13)
¯ c0 = µ0f(¯ l0)/¯ l0. (14)
When there is no altruism, ∂ϕk(m)/∂mj equals zero in Equation (9) and the public good na-
ture of South-North migration vanishes. There is no coordination failure and it is impossible
to improve the situation of developing countries without reducing welfare in the rich world.
Without altruism, the no-regret allocation is identical to the nationalist allocation. With
altruism, Equation (9) implies that the coordinated value for ∂ϕj(m)/∂mj becomes nega-
tive, i.e. each rich country goes beyond its nationalist equilibrium (in which ∂ϕj(m)/∂mj
equals zero). The set of implementability constraints (8) determines the extent to which
immigration can be increased. This yields the following propositions:
Proposition 2 In the absence of altruism, the no-regret allocation coincides with the na-
tionalist allocation, i.e.
β = 0 ⇒ ¯ m = ˜ m.
Proof: For country j, ϕj(¯ m) = ϕj(˜ m). If β = 0, ϕj depends on mj but not on the
other elements of the vector m. We can then write ϕj(¯ mj) = ϕj(˜ mj). Since, at ˜ mj, ϕj is
maximized, ¯ mj = ˜ mj.￿
Proposition 3 Assume all rich countries are similar, i.e. µj = µ, γj = γ and nj = n for
all j ∈ [1,J], and β > 0. Then the symmetric allocations ˜ m and ¯ m satisfy ¯ m > ˜ m.
Proof: With symmetric countries and allocations, the system of equalities ϕj(˜ m) = ϕj(¯ m)
reduces to ϕj(˜ m) = ϕj(¯ m), where ˜ m and ¯ m are scalars. For β > 0, we know that ϕ0
j(˜ m) > 0
thanks to the positive externality. We also know that ϕj(+∞) = −∞ because of the convex
cost of welcoming migrants. ϕj() is continuous, increases after point ˜ m, and then decreases
and tends to −∞ as m gets large. Thus ¯ m exists such that ¯ m > ˜ m and ϕj(¯ m) = ϕj(˜ m). ￿
Proposition 4 Assume β is strictly positive and close to zero. Then, ∀j : ¯ mj > ˜ mj.
11Proof: We ﬁrst decompose the utility function ϕj given in (6) into two components:
ϕj(m) = ˆ ϕj(mj) + ˘ ϕ(m).
˘ ϕ(m) includes the altruistic part (which is the same for all countries j). The implementability
constraint (12) is rewritten as:
∀j : ˆ ϕj(¯ mj) + ˘ ϕ(¯ m) = ˆ ϕj(˜ mj) + ˘ ϕ(˜ m).
Assume β is small. Since ¯ m = ˜ m for β = 0 (Proposition 2), ¯ m should be close to ˜ m for β
small, by continuity. We accordingly take a second order approximation of ˜ ϕj(¯ mj) around
˜ mj:
ˆ ϕj(¯ mj) ≈ ˆ ϕj(˜ mj) + ˆ ϕ
0





j(˜ mj)(¯ mj − ˜ mj)
2.
Because ˜ mj is close to the maximum of the function ˆ ϕj(˜ mj) (or exactly the maximum if the
relative size of the country is zero), we see that ˆ ϕ0
j(˜ mj) ≈ 0 and ˆ ϕ00
j(˜ mj) < 0. We next take
a ﬁrst-order approximation of ˘ ϕ(¯ m) around ˜ m:
˘ ϕ(¯ m) ≈ ˘ ϕ(˜ m) + [∂ ˘ ϕ/∂ ˜ mj]
0(¯ m − ˜ m).
where [∂ ˘ ϕ/∂ ˜ mj] is a vector of the ﬁrst-order derivatives of ˘ ϕ with respect to mj. Replacing
the two approximations in the implementability constraint, and simplifying, leads to:
∀j : ˆ ϕ
00
j(˜ mj)(¯ mj − ˜ mj)
2 + [∂ ˘ ϕ/∂ ˜ mj]
0(¯ m − ˜ m) ≈ 0.
We can write (¯ mj − ˜ mj)2 = (¯ mj − ˜ mj)V 0
j(¯ m − ˜ m) where Vj is a vector of zeros with a one
at position j. Replacing this expression and simplifying leads to:
∀j : ˆ ϕ
00
j(˜ mj)(¯ mj − ˜ mj)V
0
j + [∂ ˘ ϕ/∂ ˜ mj]
01J ≈ 0.
Solving for ¯ mj leads to
∀j : ¯ mj = ˜ mj −




Since all the derivatives ∂ ˘ ϕ/∂ ˜ mj are positive (externality) and ϕ00
j(˜ mj) < 0, we have ∀j :
¯ mj > ˜ mj. ￿
2.4 The Decentralization Scheme
Our decentralization scheme requires a group of rich countries to agree to put a signiﬁcant
amount of money into a global migration fund and to delegate the responsibility of managing
it to an international agency. This agency would have a constitution setting out how money
will be paid out according to changes in immigration from developing countries. As in
Gersbach and Winkler (2007)’s global refunding system to cope with CO2 emissions, no
further coordination is required, except in administering the system, measuring labor ﬂows
and distributing money. Such a system does not need additional enforcement mechanisms.
12Rich countries will choose to accept more migrants on their own, and they will not have
incentives to leave the system.
More precisely, the set of developed countries will establish a migration agency to organize
the tools needed to decentralize the cooperative solution. Each country would pay a lump
sum tax to the agency. The vector of lump-sum taxes is denoted by q. Each country would
also enjoy a subsidy per additional migrant it welcomed. The subsidy rates are country-
speciﬁc and their vector is p. In other words, each country is allowed to avoid paying the
lump-sum tax qj by welcoming immigrants and getting a subsidy pj for each of them. The
global migration fund would only involve migrants originating from developing countries.
Those immigrants would get a visa only allowing them to reside in host country j, not to
move from j to another participating country. Hence, the decentralization problem of the
agency is to deﬁne the appropriate set of taxes and subsidies such that each country j agrees
to host the optimal number of immigrants ˜ mj, and such that the agency’s global budget
constraint is balanced:
¯ p
0m − ¯ q
01J = 0. (15)
This decentralization problem can be written as follows:
Proposition 5 The no-regret allocation ¯ m can be decentralized with subsidy rates ¯ p and

























for j = 1..J. (16)
where the multipliers λ’s are solution to Equations (9).
Proof: Introducing the subsidy scheme, the objective of an individual country becomes
ˆ ϕj(m,pj,qj) = u
￿
µjf
0(nj + mj) +
1
nj

















































Replacing mj by ¯ mj (and the corresponding ¯ l0, ¯ cj and ¯ c0 from Equations (11)-(13)) and
using Equation (10) we obtain Equation (16). This condition determines the subsidy rate
such that each country will choose the no-regret level of migration. In addition, we also
need to satisfy the implementability constraint (12). Doing so requires ¯ qj = ¯ mj/pj, as
ˆ ϕj(¯ m,pj, ¯ mj/pj) = ϕj(¯ m) = ϕj(˜ m). As we have ¯ pj ¯ mj = ¯ qj ∀j, the global budget constraint
(15) is automatically satisﬁed. ￿
Our problem is not the same as the usual one in the environmental literature where a planner
targets a global level of pollution and decentralizes the optimal policy either through a tax on
13pollutants or through tradable quotas. In our case, the fact that we take the implementability
constraints (12) explicitly into account prevents the decentralization of the policy through a
uniform subsidy scheme. Indeed, Proposition 5 shows that, in the case of asymmetric host
countries, it is not possible to decentralize the no-regret allocation with a uniform subsidy p
(or alternatively with a system of tradable immigration duties in which each country would
sell/buy migrants at a market price p). The constraints (12) require the use of additional
instruments, such as the diﬀerentiated subsidy rates pj.
The same implementability constraint explains why there are no monetary transfers between
countries at the no-regret solution. Compared to the nationalist allocation, Equation (12)
implies that citizens enjoy the same level of utility by bearing more domestic immigration
costs and beneﬁting from lower global poverty. In a command optimum, a benevolent planner
could reach this solution by imposing a larger number of migrants on each host country, with
no need to transfer money between them. Hence, in a market context, we distort immigration
decisions by subsidizing immigrants, but we need to avoid additional income eﬀects. This can
be done by levying a lump-sum tax on destination countries and allowing them to retrieve
the amount paid to the global fund by hosting more migrants.
3 Quantitative Assessment
Assuming that developed countries initially conduct nationalist policies, the goal of this
section is to simulate the impact of a no-regret treaty on the immigration stock. Our model
is static and we consider that the initial nationalist allocation of labor is the allocation
observed in 2000. The outcome of our treaty depends on the number of countries involved, as
well as their size, income level and aversion towards immigration. The size is here measured
by the number of citizens, nj. The income level is determined by the level of total factor
productivity, µj. The anti-immigration sentiments of citizens are proxied by the parameter
γj which thus reﬂects concerns about redistribution, the provision of public goods, security
risks and cultural blending.
3.1 Data
The aggregate developing country (j = 0) includes all low and middle-income countries
as deﬁned in the World Bank classiﬁcation.7 For the J developed countries we considered
three diﬀerent possibilities: the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States), the high-income countries members of the OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), and a set of 42 high-income
countries (following the World Bank classiﬁcation but excluding countries with populations
of less than 250,000).
Data for nj + mj were obtained from the United Nations Population Division database
(working-age population).8 Data on mj (the number of working-age immigrants from de-
7Available from www.worldbank.org/data/.../classgroups.htm.
8Available from www.un.org/esa/population.
14veloping countries) were obtained from Parsons et al. (2007). They provide a 226 × 226
matrix of origin-destination stocks by country. The data are generated by disaggregating
the information on migrant stock in each destination country or economy as given in its
census. The reference period is the 2000 round of population censuses. The data set pro-
vides stocks of migrants, not ﬂows. Four versions of the database are available, at increasing
levels of completeness, but decreasing levels of accuracy as the missing data are added via
assumptions and interpolation with each successive version. We use the most comprehensive
bilateral matrix (version 4). This allows us to identify immigrants originating from devel-
oping countries. Since the database does not provide information on the number who are of
working-age, we assume that the proportion of working-aged migrants is the same as that
of citizens. In addition, the data set does not distinguish low-skill and high-skill migrants.
We assumed that the majority of South-North migrants are low skilled. Combining UN data
with Parsons’ database, we derived the statistics for nj and mj/nj. Table 1 gives a selection
of these statistics. It is worth noting that the ratio mj/nj exceeded one in Qatar (2.371) and
the United Arab Emirates (1.697). It exceeded 50 percent in Kuwait (0.670), Hong Kong
(0.602) and Bahrain (0.549). However, the ratio was particularly low in Korea (0.002), Malta
(0.003) and Japan (0.005).
Table 1: Data on the number of citizens and immigrants in selected countries
nj (×1000) mj/nj








Data on GDP in purchasing power parity in 2000 were obtained from the World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2008).
3.2 Calibration
We now select speciﬁc functional forms and assign values to the parameters in order to match
a series of targets. Table 2 summarizes the various parameters and the paragraphs below
describe the calibration method.
The gross domestic product is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
µjl
α
j where µj = ˆ µjn
1−α
j .
The explicit inclusion of n
1−α
j captures the fact that the quantity of other potential ﬁxed
factors (such as land or physical capital) is proportional to the number of citizens. Using
15the production function, we calibrate the parameters ˆ µj to match cross-country diﬀerences
in GDP in the developed world. ˆ µj reﬂects total factor productivity and, as we will see in
Figure 1, is independent of the size of the country.
The utility function u(.) is logarithmic. This choice is comforted by the fact that there is no
signiﬁcant correlation between productivity and observed immigration rates, a result which
is obtained when the elasticity of marginal utility to consumption is 1 (see Proposition 1).
Using the chosen utility and production functions for the analysis of the nationalist allo-
cation (Section 2.2), it can be shown that the migrants share of the population, ˜ mj/nj, is
independent of the size of the local population nj if and only if β = 0. In the absence of
altruism (β = 0), the ﬁrst order derivative (7) depends on mj and nj only through the ratio
mj/nj. When there is some altruism (β > 0), the size of the country aﬀects its capacity
to improve the situation of the worst oﬀ, and mj/nj will be aﬀected by the country size
nj. However, for low values of β, this eﬀect is hardly perceptible (a property veriﬁed by the
data).
The cost of immigration is given by the quadratic function γj(mj/nj)2/2. To identify γj
from Equation (7), we need to calibrate the altruism factor β. We know from the literature
that, in multi-person dictator games, many subjects care about the worst-oﬀ player’s payoﬀ.
Hence, β is likely to be positive. Unfortunately, the literature does not contain a value for
this parameter that we can readily apply to our context. Charness and Rabin (2002, 2005)
though, provide estimates for a parameter ρ which is related to our β. They assume that
the “social” utility function for players’s B is ρrxA + (1 − ρr)xB, where xA is the pay-oﬀ
of player A, xB is the payoﬀ of player B, r = 1 if xB > xA, and r = 0 otherwise. In this
context, the marginal rate of substitution between the payoﬀ of the rich and that of the poor
is: −ρ/(1−ρ). While in our model, the marginal rate of substitution between the rich house-
hold’s consumption and that of the developing country’s households is: −βu0(c0)/u0(cj). The
parameter ρ which best reproduces the data from from Charness and Rabin (2005) dictator
games is 0.344.(Considering dictator games only avoids possible confounds with reciprocity






Table 2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Target
α 2/3 observed labor income share
βmax 0.07 experimental evidence from Charness and Rabin (2005)
β ∈ (0,βmax)
β0 0.007 benchmark value
µj see Fig. 1 observed GDP per worker (PPP)
γj see Fig. 1 ˜ mj = observed migration stock
16Using US data for cj leads to β = 0.07. We consider this rather large number as an upper
bound for the true parameter β and denote it by βmax. Indeed, while the basic motives such
as aversion for inequality or altruism seem to be quite robust, the exact functional form of
the models and the parameters used in this literature are not - they vary with the game
played, the subjects used in the experiments, etc. For example, Bekkers (2007) displays
a more pessimistic view of altruism. Respondents to a survey had to decide whether to
donate what they earned by participating in the survey. The money oﬀered by respondents
beneﬁtted charities (so it measured altruism with respect to the distant poor). Only 5.7%
of the participants donated. It is not possible however to infer a value for our preference
parameter β based on this survey, since the game never allowed the reward to be split
between oneself and the recipient.
A simple numerical example allows us to show that βmax is too high. Using our logarithmic
utility function and disregarding migration, let us introduce the possibility of a monetary
transfer from a rich country with income per capita at US$40,000 (i.e. approximately the
US level) to a poor country with income per capita at US$250 (i.e. the level observed in
the 20 poorest countries of the world). Assuming identical sizes, the optimal transfer from
the perspective of the rich country would amount to about US$2,500, i.e. ten times the
level of pre-transfer income of the poor country. The World Development Indicators reveal
that oﬃcial aid to the poorest countries only represents 12.2 percent of their GDP. Such an
amount can be obtained by using β0 = 0.007 = βmax/10. Consequently, we will use β0 as the
benchmark value, but provide simulation results for all values of β comprised between zero
and βmax.
Based on the nationalist optimal migration policy deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2 (see eq (7)) we
calibrated the γj to match the observed immigration stocks in developed countries. Since
all countries have a positive level of immigration, the possibility of corner solutions is ruled
out. In the high-income country group, the calibrated γj ranged from 0.018 (Qatar) to 0.122
(South Korea). Figure 1 shows the calibrated {µj,γj} for each country. There is no sign of
correlation between productivity and aversion towards emigration.
3.3 No-regret allocation (with β0)
Assuming that β takes its benchmark value β0, we next computed the corresponding no-
regret allocation. This basically amounts to solving the system
ϕj(˜ m) = ϕj(¯ m)
where the vector ˜ m is equal to the vector of observed migration levels. In our numerical ex-
periments, we consider three alternative sets of participating countries, as mentioned above.
Table 3 displays the allocations obtained for each host country.
Table 4 provides some summary statistics. The additional migration made possible by the
no-regret allocation ranges from 12.8 to 24.4 million working age migrants depending on the
set of countries considered. These numbers are rather large compared to the 42.5 million
migrants originating from developing countries and living in high-income countries today
(+44, +66 and +57 percent respectively for the three sets considered). This shows that,
17Table 3: Migration stocks in diﬀerent allocations and sets of participating countries
Country Nationalist No-regret (β0)
G7 OECD High income
Australia 1011 1467 1477
Austria 536 737 742
Bahamas 12 18
Bahrain 129 135
Belgium 351 664 671
Brunei 50 53
Canada 2109 2626 2796 2812
Cyprus 16 39
Denmark 148 320 323
Finland 56 249 252
France 2967 4085 4452 4486
Germany 4753 6338 6874 6925
Greece 624 907 914
Hong Kong 1764 1843
Iceland 5 13 13
Ireland 45 166 169
Israel 949 1015
Italy 915 2497 2962 3005
Japan 498 3152 4059 4144
Korea Rep 72 1613 1649
Kuwait 524 545
Luxembourg 18 30 31
Macao 15 27
Malta 1 16
Netherlands 774 1201 1211
New Zealand 125 227 229
Norway 123 262 265
Portugal 308 612 619
Qatar 247 250
Saudi Arabia 2111 2327
Singapore 363 442
Slovenia 34 106
Spain 1018 2329 2357
Sweden 410 655 660
Switzerland 525 700 704
UAE 1047 1065
UK 1838 3138 3544 3582
USA 16000 2054 21628 21777






































with a reasonable altruism, the public-good externality of migration policy is very signiﬁcant.
The sensitivity of the results to altruism is analyzed in a subsequent section. The change in
immigration rates is mostly increasing with γj. On average, the no-regret allocation requires
countries with high γj and low nationalist immigration rates to host more migrants. In
these countries (e.g. Korea, Japan), the marginal cost of hosting migrants is lower given the
convex form of g(mj/nj).
We also computed the eﬀect of such large migration ﬂows on the ratio between US GDP
and the average GDP in developing countries. This ratio is reduced from 7.07 to 6.98 in the
most favorable case where all high-income countries participate in the scheme.
Table 4: Total additional working age migration (×1000) and ratio of US GDP to developing
world GDP under the various scenarios
Nationalist No-regret (β0)
G7 OECD High income






7.07 6.81 6.98 6.98
Finally, there is a big diﬀerence between the gains if all high-income OECD countries are
involved compared to the situation where only the G7 countries participated in the treaty.
19By enlarging the pool of participating countries, we make the externalities stronger, which
translates into a bigger diﬀerence between no-regret and nationalist allocations. However,
enlarging the pool of rich countries further, to include non-OECD high income countries,
does not bring many additional gains.
3.4 Decentralization (with β0)
We then computed the vectors of subsidies ¯ p and lump-sum taxes ¯ q that would make the no-
regret allocation incentive compatible (Proposition 5). Table 5 gives the result. The subsidies
pj are computed for 1,000,000 additional migrants and expressed in USD per citizen.9 We
ﬁrst observe that households in small countries receive more per migrant than households
in large countries. Indeed, welcoming 1,000 additional migrants is much more signiﬁcant
in Luxembourg than in the US. To a lower extent, the subsidy per migrant increases with
the level of productivity: citizens from richer countries require higher subsidies to welcome
additional migrants. Finally, we also observe that subsidies are larger when the set of
countries participating in the arrangement is larger. This occurs because the size of the
positive externality increases with the size of the set of participating countries.
To evaluate whether our scheme implies a reasonable initial contribution to the global mi-
gration fund, Table 6 presents the ratio
qj − pj ˜ mj
µjf(nj + ˜ mj)
=
pj(¯ mj − ˜ mj)
µjf(nj + ˜ mj)
which expresses the lump-sum contribution as a percentage of GDP (net of due subsidies for
existing migrants), or, equivalently, the total subsidies received for hosting ¯ mj− ˜ mj additional
migrants. This contributions varies with the size of the country. In the G7 package, it ranges
between 0.17 and 0.26 percent of GDP. In the high-income package, it goes between 0.25 and
0.66 percent of GDP. This is of the same order of magnitude as foreign aid; however, in our
case, countries get their contributions back once they have welcomed the targeted number
of additional migrants.
3.5 Robustness analysis
The number of additional migrants generated by the no-regret allocation depends on the
value of the welfare externality, i.e. on the rate of altruism and the eﬀect of migration on
income in developing countries. Above, the latter goes only through increasing marginal
productivity of labor in developing this section, we evaluate the robustness of our results
to the choice of the altruism factor, β, and to the inclusion of remittances. These two
ingredients are susceptible to modify the value of the externality. In particular, remittances
9The subsidy per citizen should be considered as an annual amount, since all the GDP data we used
are annual. If migrants stay on average 30 years in the destination countries and the real interest rate is 3
percent, a subsidy of 3.9 (Australia, OECD package) implies a total discounted subsidy of about 80 dollars
per 1,000,000 immigrants for a 30 years residence.
20Table 5: Subsidy per citizen pj/nj for 1,000,000 additional migrants (in USD)
Country No-regret (β0)











France 0.7 1.0 1.1






Italy 0.5 0.8 0.8
Japan 0.3 0.4 0.4

















UK 0.6 0.9 1.0
USA 0.2 0.3 0.3
21Table 6: Initial contributions to the migration Fund as % of GDP
Country No-regret (β0)











France 0.0022 0.0044 0.0046






Italy 0.0026 0.0050 0.0052
Japan 0.0021 0.0042 0.0045

















UK 0.0024 0.0046 0.0049
USA 0.0017 0.0034 0.0036
22are quantitatively important at the global level and may well have a stronger impact on
developing countries than changes going through labor markets.
Regarding remittances, we assume the each migrant remits a fraction θ of her/his income to










The fraction θ is calibrated so as to match the ratio of remittances to GDP observed in
developing countries (i.e. 1.46 percent in 2000) under the nationalist allocation. This leads
to θ = 0.23. This proportion is in line with recent empirical studies on the determinants of
remittances. Bollard et al. (2009) recently combined 14 household surveys on remittances
and income, covering 11 countries. The average ”remittances/income” ratio obtained for
household with no university degree ranges from 2 percent (in the Australian database) to
34 percent (in the Spanish database). Our θ belongs to this interval. Kangasniemi, Winters,
and Commander (2007) showed that more than half of Indian medical doctors working in
the UK remit income to their home country, and these transfers represent on average 16% of
remitters’ income. For this group of high-skill workers, remittances thus represent about 10
percent of their total income. Our value for θ is above this proportion, but looks reasonable
since low-skill migrants are usually seen as remitting a higher proportion of their income
than the highly skilled.
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of the altruism factor β on the increase in migration we could
obtained by implementing a no-regret allocation we let β vary between 0 and the upper
bound βmax obtained from experimental games. For each value of β, we recalibrated the γj
in such a way that the nationalist allocation matched the observed data. We then computed
the new no-regret allocation and the change in total migration compared to the nationalist
allocation.
The left panel of Figure 2 reports the result for the G7 group. The relation between the gain
in migration and the altruism factor is concave. With β as low as 0.007 we have 12.8 million
new migrants (+44 percent), while with β = 0.001, the number of additional migrants would
still be 3 million (+7 percent). Hence, we do not need implausibly large values of β for our
international agreement to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Including remittances strongly increases
the number of additional migrants generated by our no-regret allocation (+30 million rather
than +12.8 million with β0 = 0.007). With remittances, even a small rate of altruism
allows important increases in global labor movements without any utility cost for the rich.
Moreover, the results depicted on Figure 2 can be considered as a lower bound since oﬃcial
records underestimate the full scale of remittances. Conservatively adding 50 percent to
oﬃcial ﬂows (see World Bank, 2008) would further increase θ and the eﬀectiveness of our no
regret treaty. Hence, when all rich countries are averse to global inequality, albeit to a very
small extent, setting up a global migration fund designed to coordinate national immigration
policies is likely to generate huge welfare gains for millions of additional migrants and for
billions of individuals left in the poor world.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the average migration subsidy per native as a function
of the altruism factor β. Unlike total additional migration, the relation here is linear. It is
23Figure 2: Sensitivity of the results to the altruism factor

















Note: G7 group - solid line: benchmark - dotted line: with remittances
worth noticing that the average subsidy is almost multiplied by four when remittances are
factored in.
4 Conclusion
Most of the literature on the political economy of migration is written from the point of
view of the host country. For example, Benhabib (1996) and Crettez (2007) consider the
immigration policy voted for by citizens. These studies give a richer description of what
we called above a nationalist policy, with diﬀerent instruments and heterogeneous citizens,
but they do not consider ways to improve upon such policy to increase global welfare. A
few papers take the point of view of a benevolent planner maximizing world welfare as for
example Benhabib and Jovanovic (2007). They show how the optimal policy depends on
technology (constant or decreasing social return, relative backwardness of poor countries,
externalities) and on the weight the planner attaches to rich countries. However, they do
not care about rich countries’ incentives to conduct such an optimal policy.
Our study relies on the fact that political economy mechanisms are essential to understand
or inﬂuence immigration policies in rich countries. Compared to these two strands of the
literature we take a diﬀerent point of view: maximizing world welfare subject to an imple-
mentability constraint, expressing the idea that the rich countries are not ready to accept
any loss of welfare. We accordingly proposed a political mechanism that improves the inter-
national allocation of labor by considering solutions that are politically acceptable in rich
countries.
24Increasing migration and reducing global inequality subject to the implementability con-
straint is possible provided that households are averse to inequality. Nevertheless, in the
absence of any coordinating device, citizen in any given rich country lack incentives to
welcome additional migrants as this policy is a global public good, beneﬁtting to all rich
countries. We showed that we can construct a “no-regret” allocation taking into account the
public good nature of immigration policy better, and that this allocation can be supported
by a tax-subsidy scheme.
In order to quantitatively assess the increase in migration that such a no-regret allocation can
bring, we calibrated the model using statistics on immigration, working-age population and
output. We simulated the proposed scheme on diﬀerent sets of rich countries. We showed
that if altruism is as strong as predicted by experimental games, our policy would produce
a very signiﬁcant increase in global migration; but even for low levels of altruism, the eﬀect
of our policy would not be negligible.
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